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Congressional-Executive Tensions in Managing the
Arms Control Agenda-Who's in Charge?
Kevin C. Kennedy*
I. Introduction
The subject of national security presents extremely delicate and
thorny issues. Governmental discussions of national security issues
too often degenerate into heated, partisan shouting matches not
only between members of Congress but also between Congress and
the White House. The unfortunate result of this discord has been an
arms control and disarmament process that moves haltingly, to the
extent that it moves at all. How can this process be advanced? One
necessary condition is a President committed to arms control and
disarmament. An equally important prerequisite is a close partner-
ship between Congress and the President in fashioning an arms con-
trol agenda, negotiating arms control agreements, and implementing
concluded agreements. To that end this Article proposes adoption
of a "fast-track" arms control procedure-a process borrowed from
international trade legislation first enacted by Congress in 1974.' In
the fast-track procedure, Congress authorizes the President to con-
duct trade negotiations with one or more U.S. trading partners, to
reach agreement within a fixed period of time, and to report the re-
sults of those negotiations to Congress within that time period. Con-
gress then has a limited time period (typically ninety days) to
approve or reject the entire trade agreement package without
amendment. 2 This procedure has been used successfully in recent
bilateral trade negotiations with Canada and Israel, and in multilat-
eral trade negotiations in Geneva. 3 Adoption of this approach for
the arms control process will potentially speed negotiations by pro-
tecting the President from being undermined by small but powerful
factions within Congress. By forcing Congress to consider an arms
control agreement as a package, the fast-track procedure will prevent
* Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law. J.D. 1977, Wayne State University
School of Law; L.L.M. 1982, Harvard Law School.
I Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988)).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, § 102(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112).
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members of Congress from offering amendments that could force
renegotiation of the entire agreement.
An alternative approach that this Article will also discuss, which
assumes a President deeply committed to arms control, is use of the
sole executive agreement to conclude arms control and disarmament
accords, thereby avoiding potential congressional rejection of agree-
ments. This Article considers the narrow legal issue of whether the
President has the constitutional power to conclude bilateral and mul-
tilateral arms control agreements as sole executive agreements, that
is, with neither the advice and consent of the Senate nor approval of
the full Congress. Although the question is a close one, this Article
concludes that absent a congressional directive to the contrary, the
President does possess such authority, but he is divested of such au-
thority if Congress has directed him to present arms control agree-
ments to it for its approval. Furthermore, this Article concludes that
Congress may directly restrict the President's use of that power for
arms control negotiations and agreements. This conclusion is
reached largely from a study of congressional oversight in constitu-
tional practice over the past thirty years, as well as from the text of
the Constitution-principally, the congressional power to raise ar-
mies, appropriate funds, and declare war.4
Turning from law to politics and the broader perspective of pol-
icy, assuming that neither congressional approval nor Senate advice
and consent could be constitutionally required before the President
entered into an arms control agreement binding upon the United
States, it could be asked whether it would be prudent for the Presi-
dent nevertheless to exercise such power without seeking congres-
sional approval. A corollary question would be whether there would
be any political wisdom in using the sole executive agreement as the
legal vehicle for concluding arms control agreements or whether a
sole executive arms control agreement would poison the well of bi-
partisanship. A further issue is whether stable and strategically sig-
nificant arms control agreements are possible if they do not receive a
congressional imprimatur. As these questions suggest, there are,
even if not mandated by constitutional practice or the text of the
Constitution, compelling policy reasons for presenting arms control
agreements to Congress for its approval.
Nevertheless, the forces behind the development, testing, and
deployment of defense systems are highly dynamic. The negotiation
of agreements limiting and banning these weapon systems is compa-
rably complex and dynamic; agreements are frequently linked so that
progress in one area of arms control (e.g., limiting strategic nuclear
weapons) hinges upon consensus in another area (e.g., banning the
deployment of space-based missile defense systems). In this milieu
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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of rapid technological change and linkage, sole executive agreements
might be a preferable method for reaching arms control accords.
First, because of the lightning pace at which nuclear weapons deliv-
ery system technologies are developed and deployed, they often
overtake the sometimes plodding and rancorous Senate advice and
consent process. 5 Second, sole executive agreements give the Presi-
dent a degree of flexibility in both the negotiation and compliance
phases of the agreement that is absent in the article II treaty process.
For example, in responding to questions of compliance with an arms
control accord, the executive branch's options in dealing with
whether the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station in the So-
viet Union was a material breach of the ABM Treaty were circum-
scribed by the Senate having given its advice. and consent to that
agreement, thus tying the White House's hands in the way it would
address the issue.6 The ABM Treaty reinterpretation controversy7 is
another example of a Senate-executive branch imbroglio that proba-
bly would have been avoided had that agreement been an executive
agreement rather than an article II treaty. 8
Although the sole executive agreement as an arms control vehi-
cle might afford the President greater freedom of action and room
for maneuver, many would contend that it is fortunate his authority
to interpret such vitally important international agreements has been
circumscribed by congressional participation in the approval pro-
cess. Regardless of this issue, it is clear that Congress has not been a
mere spectator in the arms control arena. The SALT I and SALT II
experiences, in which Congress formulated negotiating policy in one
instance and sent advisers to the negotiations themselves in another,
bear witness to the influence Congress has had on the progress and
pace of arms control agreements. 9 Whether the text of the Constitu-
tion permits such congressional activism, it is nevertheless a political
fact of life for the President. Even if the President has the constitu-
tional authority to conclude arms control agreements through the
sole executive agreement, to act on that authority could strain rela-
tions with Congress to the breaking point, given the keen interest
Congress has shown in arms control.' 0
5 For an overview of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, see T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN & M.
HOENIG, U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES (1984); T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN, R. NOR-
RIS &J. SANDS, SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1989).
I; See generally Earle & Rhinelander, The Krasnoyarsk Radar-A 'Material Breach' of the
ABA! Treaty?, 18 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No. 7, Sept. 1988, at 9.
7 See, e.g., Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABJ! Treaty and
Star -'ars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1986).
8 See Rhinelander & Rubin, An Insider's Accont of the AB,1 Treaty Negotiating Record:
.Missiou Accomplished, 17 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No. 7, Sept. 1987, at 3.
1) T. WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE 45-47 (1979).
14 See. e.g., Isaacs, The World Changes-The Defense Budget Doesn't, 19 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, No. 10, Jan. 1990, at 17; Harkin, Star Wars: .4 Trojan tlorsefor ASAT Weapons, 19
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No. 2, Mar. 1989, at 3; Hochbrueckner & McCloskey, A Sensible
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Adoption of the fast-track approach is an alternative to the sole
executive agreement that would include Congress in the arms con-
trol process. Before examining the fast-track mechanism, this Article
first reviews the origins and uses of the sole executive agreement in
the conduct of U.S. foreign relations and then considers the question
of whether the sole executive agreement can be used to conclude
arms control agreements.
II. International Agreements and the Law of the United States
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States identifies four types of international agreements that the Presi-
dent may conclude:
(1) the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, may
make any international agreement of the United States in the form
of a treaty;
(2) the President, with the authorization or approval of Congress,
may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that
falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the
Constitution;
(3) the President may make an international agreement as author-
ized by treaty of the United States;
(4) the President, on his own authority, may make an international
agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent
powers under the Constitution.I I
Thus, besides the article II "treaty" that becomes law with the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate,' 2 three other categories of
international agreement are found in the law of the United States:
congressional-executive agreements (category (2) above), executive
agreements pursuant to treaty (category (3) above), and sole execu-
tive agreements (category (4) above). In U.S. foreign relations prac-
tice, many more executive agreements (mostly the congressional-
executive variety) have been concluded than article II treaties. 13 As
of 1983, the United States was party to 906 treaties and 6,571 execu-
tive agreements. ' 4
Never sharp, the line between when an international agreement
must be concluded by treaty and when it can be reached through one
of the other three constitutional forms has blurred over the
Initiative for the SDI Budget, 18 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No. 5, June 1988, at 3; Bumpers,
Chafee & Leahy, Salvaging SALT: The New Congressional Compromise, 17 ARMS CONTROL To-
DAY, No. 10, Dec. 1987, at 3.
1 RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENTI.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
13 RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 303 Reporters' Note 8.
14 Id. One author has concluded that of the executive agreements entered into be-
tween 1938 and 1957, only 5.9% were sole executive agreements. McLaughlin, The Scope
of the Treaty Power in the U nited States II, 43 MINN. L. REV. 651, 721 (1959).
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decades. 15 The Restatement concludes that "[s]ince any agreement
concluded as a Congressional-Executive agreement could also be
concluded as a treaty ... , either method may be used in many cases.
The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement
can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every in-
stance."' 16 However, in connection with sole executive agreements,
the Restatement adds that "[t]he validity of [congressional] restrictions
on Presidential powers, and of attempts to control and limit sole ex-
ecutive agreements generally, has not been authoritatively deter-
mined . . . . Their status in relation to earlier Congressional
legislation has not been authoritatively determined."' 17 Professor
Louis Henkin concedes that "[n]o one has doubted that the Presi-
dent has the power to make some 'sole' executive agreements,"' 8
but precisely where to draw the line as to those agreements which he
may make wholly on his own authority and those which must be sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and consent is not clear.' 9
Some commentators argue that certain international agreements
can only be made as treaties pursuant to article II, section 2.20 Other
authorities have suggested just the opposite-that the President pos-
sesses the independent constitutional power to conclude an interna-
tional agreement on any subject touching upon foreign relations
with another country. This position is based upon the inherent for-
eign affairs power of the President 2' and the authority of United States
v. Belmont,22 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Litvinov Agreement. 23 The difficulty with this "anything inter-
national goes" position, Professor Henkin counters, is that it proves
too much; if the President is in fact vested with such sweeping au-
thority, then the article II check of the Senate is eliminated. 2 4 De-
spite Professor Henkin's misgivings, it is impossible to state before
the fact whether a particular subject can be concluded as a treaty
only or whether the executive agreement option is also available.
The Constitution is textually too vague as to which of the various
15 The Constitution of the UnIted States, Analvsis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 521 (1987).
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 303 comment e.
17 Id. § 303 comment j.
18 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1972).
I" See id. at 179.
'20 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1I, § 303 Reporters' Note 8 (citing Borchard, Shall the
Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944); Borchard, Treaties and Execu-
tive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YAIE L.J. 616 (1945)).
21 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
22 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937).
23 See, e.g., W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 330, 363 (1941);
Mathews, The Constitutional Powter of the President to Conclude Intera~tional .4greements., 64 YALE
L.J. 345, 370-75 (1955).
24 L. HENKIN, snpr note 18, at 179.
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methods of concluding an international agreement is the constitu-
tionally permissible one.
Among those commentators who argue for a strong Senate
check on presidential power to conclude international agreements is
Professor Borchard, who observed that "[t]he Constitution refers
only to treaties, . . . and says nothing about Presidential executive
agreements."' 25 Consequently,
[a]greements benefiting the United States or agreements settling is-
sues without obligating the country, especially if of minor impor-
tance, rarely evoke challenge. It is only agreements of a more
important character, involving future commitments, that encroach
upon the treaty-making power of the Senate. If a substantial opin-
ion in the Senate demands submission of an agreement for approval
as a treaty, no President should resolve the doubt in his favor and
defy the Senate and the Constitution.
2 6
But even Professor Borchard, who expressed his views before
the advent of the nuclear age, conceded the existence of presidential
power to conclude international agreements on the President's sole
authority. "We all know," he wrote, "that [the President] has wide
authority as a diplomatic officer and Commander-in-Chief to make
certain agreements on his own responsibility with foreign powers. '"27
Professor Borchard's view that the President is without constitu-
tional power to conclude international agreements on his sole au-
thority has been rejected by others within the academic
community. 28 Relying on judicial decisions and 150 years of govern-
mental practice, Professors McDougal and Lans found ample sup-
port for the constitutionality of sole executive agreements:
The practices of successive administrations, supported by the Con-
gress and by numerous court decisions, have for all practical pur-
poses made the Congressional-Executive agreement authorized or
sanctioned by both houses of Congress interchangeable with the
agreements ratified under the treaty clause by two-thirds of the Sen-
ate. The same decisive authorities have likewise made agreements
negotiated by the President, on his own responsibility and within the
scope of his own constitutional powers, appropriate instruments for
handling many important aspects of our foreign relations. Initial
choice of the procedure to be followed for securing validation of any
particular intergovernmental agreement lies with the President since
it is constitutional practice unquestioned since Washington's day
that the President alone has the power to propose or dispose in the
actual conduct of negotiations with other governments. 2 9
25 Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664, 667
(1944).
'26 Id. at 674.
27 Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply. 54 YALE L.J. 616, 649 (1945).
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1I, § 303 Reporters' Note 8 (citing L. HENKIN, supra note
18, at 173-76; McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Polic*v1, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945)).
29 McDougal & Lans, supra note 28, at 187-88 (footnotes omitted).
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Professors McDougal and Lans noted that no legal distinction
exists in international law between a Senate-ratified treaty and a sole
executive agreement.30 Moreover, they added, from a domestic con-
stitutional law perspective it is "fantastic" to assume that the Consti-
tution is a static document to be interpreted from a Framers'-intent
point of view-an analysis that could cause the literal-minded reader
to conclude that the treaty clause of article II, section 2 is the only
constitutionally permissible method for concluding any international
agreement. 3'
It is questionable whether the Senate's article II check has any
relevance to agreements limiting weapons of mass destruction un-
known to and unanticipated by the Framers. Such weapons are sui
generis. They render moot Congress's power to declare war, given
the short response time available to the Commander-in-Chief to
launch a retaliatory strike. The first use of such weapons against the
United States and its military assets would leave the executive branch
with no time for deliberation, least of all consultation with Congress
to seek from it a declaration of war.
McDougal and Lans pointed out that the Constitution gives the
President power to conclude international agreements on "his own
power ... as 'the Executive,' 'the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy,' and 'the sole organ of the government' in the conduct of
international negotiations. "32 As Commander-in-Chief, the Presi-
dent has the power "to make agreements with foreign nations to pro-
tect the military security of the United States, both in time of war and
of peace."' 33 Included among those peacetime agreements have
been arms limitation agreements; the most famous is the 1817 Rush-
Bagot Agreement with Great Britain limiting naval armaments on the
Great Lakes, the precursor to establishment of the longest demilita-
rized border in the world.3 4
In addition to the powers derived from the Commander-in-
Chief clause, article II, section 3 charges the President with the duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and among the
many laws of the United States to be faithfully executed is interna-
tional law.3 5 Many legal scholars argue that the possession or use of
30 Id. at 195-96.
:31 Id. at 214-15. To the same effect is Wallace McClure's argument that, regardless of
the Founding Fathers' intentions, the practice of concluding international agreements
through the device of the executive agreement has become a fixed part of the constitu-
tional landscape. W. MCCLURE, supra note 23, at 190.
32 McDougal & Lans, supra note 28, at 244-45 (footnote omitted).
33 Id. at 246-47 (footnote omitted).
34 See infa note 47 and accompanying text.
T5 he Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11,
§ 131. See also E. CORWIN, TuE PRESIDENT 224-25 (1984); Charney, Judicial Deference in
Foreign Relations, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 805, 808 (1989) (stating that international law for the
judiciary is as much "real" law as domestic law is).
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nuclear weapons violates international law. 36 If so, then the Presi-
dent would not only have the power but the responsibility to disman-
tle the U.S. nuclear arsenal through a bilateral or multilateral arms
control executive agreement.
Turning to constitutional practice to bolster their argument,
Professors McDougal and Lans contended that the text of the Con-
stitution dealing with foreign relations has been modified by usage.
For example, contrary to the intentions of the Framers, the Senate
plays little or no role in most treaty negotiations.3 7 The President
has the power to terminate treaties unilaterally without the consent
of the Senate. 38 Finally, McDougal and Lans concluded that no line
of demarcation can be drawn on the basis of logic between what is a
proper subject matter for a treaty, on the one hand, and an executive
agreement, on the other.39 Rather, it is policy considerations, not a
close reading of the Constitution, that guide resort to one or the
other method of concluding an international agreement.40
Wallace McClure draws a similar conclusion based on constitu-
tional practice:
[Tihere would seem to be no more doubt of the constitutional valid-
ity of one method [of reaching an international agreement] than of
the other. Accordingly, since no division or limitation of the subject
matter of international acts is laid down, there is, primafacie, no rea-
son to deny the existence of constitutional authorization for the use
of executive agreements relating to whatever subjects may be dealt
with by the treaty-making power. 4 1
McClure adds that the executive agreement is in fact the norm rather
than the exception, and that Senate advice and consent is a depar-
ture from that norm.4 2
Sole executive agreements have. been concluded by the Presi-
dent under his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, his
express power to receive ambassadors, and his foreign affairs
power. 43 With one notable exception-the Litvinov Agreement by
which President Roosevelt recognized the government of the Soviet
Union 44-sole executive agreements have mainly involved the armed
36 For essays on the legality of nuclear weapons under international law, see gener-
ally E. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1990); N. SINGH & E. MCWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1989); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (I. Pogany ed. 1987); Nu-
CLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (A. Miller & M. Feinrider eds. 1984).
37 McDougal & Lans, supra note 28, at 304.
38 Id. at 305-06; Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31) McDougal & Lans, supra note 28, at 187.
40 Id. at 312. See generally Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REV. 109 (1984).
41 W. MCCLURE, supra note 23, at 32.
412 Id. at 259.
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
44 See S. Doc. No. 16, supra note 15, at 530.
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forces of the United States, 45 thereby providing little opportunity for
litigation challenging such agreements in U.S. courts. 46 Indeed,
most commentators identify the first sole executive agreement as the
Rush-Bagot Agreement in 181747 between the United States and
Great Britain which demilitarized the Great Lakes. The Louisiana
Purchase and the annexation of Texas were also achieved through
the sole executive agreement. 48 The agreements concluded at Pots-
dam and Yalta likewise were by executive agreement. 49 While resort
to the formal treaty process enjoyed a brief resurgence with multina-
tional defense agreements concluded in the early post-war years, the
executive agreement soon replaced the treaty in this respect. 50 The
only rebuff either house of Congress was capable of mustering was a
sense of the Senate passed in 1969.5'
If the President has the constitutional power to conclude an
arms control agreement on his sole authority-as the foregoing com-
mentators suggest he does-the question then is whether he may do
so in the face of an express congressional directive that all such
agreements be submitted to the Senate or both houses of Congress
for approval. It is this question that the next part of this Article
addresses.
III. The Sole Executive Agreement and Arms Control
The question of whether the President has the power to con-
clude sole executive agreements on arms control issues is more than
academic. Thirty years ago Congress passed the Arms Control and
45 RESTATEMENT, supra note I1, § 303 Reporters' Note 11.
46 Because the Litvinov Agreement included the assignment to the United States of
private claims belonging to the Soviet Union, private parties challenged the constitutional-
ity of the agreement. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
47 Rush-Bagot Agreement, 8 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 110 1/2 (1817). Professor Henkin
suggests that the Rush-Bagot Agreement may have been a congressional-executive agree-
ment because Congress two years earlier had authorized the President to sell or lay up all
the armed vessels on the Great Lakes. L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at 179 n.22. See also W.
MCCLURE, supra note 23, at 31.
48 See R. BLANCHARD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE
UNITED STATES 17, 25, 27, 30 (1903); Garrison, First Stage of the Movementfor the Annexation of
Texas, 10 AM. HIST. REV. 72-96 (1904).
49 S. Doc. No. 16, supra note 15, at 531. For additional examples of sole executive
agreements, see id. at 529-31; L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at 179-80.
50 S. Doc. No. 16, supra note 15, at 531.
51 S. REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), which provided:
Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in re-
cent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by
the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from
affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the
United States Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other
legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a
commitment.
Id. at I.
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Disarmament Act, 52 a law designed to guarantee continuing congres-
sional direction and input to the executive branch in formulating and
implementing arms control and disarmament policy. The core of the
Act consists of institutional provisions which establish within the ex-
ecutive branch the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.5 3 The
Agency is responsible for dealing with the daunting but transcendent
problem of reducing and controlling weapons of all kinds. 54 In or-
der to entrench itself in this process, Congress enacted section 33 of
the Act which provides in part:
[N]o action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that
will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the
Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant
to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution
or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Con-
gress of the United States.5 5
In referring to the proviso in section 33 that all arms control
agreements be submitted to one or both houses of Congress for ap-
proval, the House Conference Report to the Arms Control Act 56
notes that the proviso "does not interfere in any way with the Presi-
dent's authority to control the size of U.S. Armed Forces under ex-
isting law."'5 7 The legislative history of the Arms Control Act noted
in at least two places that a congressional imprimatur is necessary
before the President may commit the United States to any formal
arms control regime. 58 In connection with any arms control verifica-
tion regime, the Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to
the Arms Control Act notes:
The definition of disarmament contained in the bill includes both
limited measures, frequently referred to as arms control measures,
and more comprehensive arms reductions. In either case, the action
would be taken under an international agreement.... The commit-
tee believes that arms reduction agreements must provide for ade-
quate verification so that each party may know that all other parties
are living up to the agreement .... [T]here is no authority to com-
mit the United States to any such control system unless the action is
taken pursuant to an international agreement which was ratified by
the Senate or otherwise authorized or approved by Congress,
although as is now the case, preparations for carrying out such an
agreement could be made before it was ratified, authorized, or
approved. 59
52 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2590 (1988)).
53 22 U.S.C. § 2561.
54 22 U.S.C. §§ 2571-2577.
55 22 U.S.C. § 2573.
56 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1263, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2923.
57 Id. at 2925.
58 H.R. REP. No. 1165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2903, 2911.
5) Id. In this connection, the two verification agreements signed at Jackson Hole,
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When the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was amended in
1963, the Senate introduced an amendment to section 33 which
would limit the required congressional approval of the reduction of
U.S. armed forces or armaments to "the constitutional processes of
the United States." '60 This proposal-echoing language found in
the Connally Resolution passed by the Senate in 1943 6 1-was not
adopted, leaving the original language of section 33 unamended. 6 2
The report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs explained
that "[i]t is the purpose of the language now in the law, which is
retained by the committee amendment, that any action obligating the
United States to disarm, reduce, or limit our Armed Forces or arma-
ments, shall have congressional approval either in the form of a
treaty ratified by the Senate or, in the case of an obligation other
than a treaty, by a majority vote of the House and Senate."'63
The plain language and legislative history of section 33 strongly
suggest that Congress intended that either one or both Houses ap-
prove any arms control agreement concluded by the executive
branch. Section 33 seems to contemplate arms control agreements
that are concluded either as article II treaties or as congressional-
Wyoming, on September 23, 1989, by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze raise an interesting question of compliance with this con-
gressional directive since neither one was approved by Congress. (For the text of these
agreements, see 19 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No. 8, Oct. 1989, at 23-25.) One of those
agreements is a memorandum of understanding concerning verification and data ex-
change on chemical weapons, under the terms of which the Soviet Union and the United
States agreed to a two-phase data exchange and on-site verification of their respective
chemical weapons capabilities. The second agreement reached at Jackson Hole dealt with
principles of implementing trial verification procedures pending the conclusion of a treaty
on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and ultimately to be included in
such treaty. Both agreements entered into force upon signature.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee also stated that the same congressional ap-
proval process was required in connection with agreements designed to strengthen inter-
national organizations:
[SIteps to strengthen international organizations would not come within the
definition unless taken pursuant to an international disarmament agreement,
which would have to be ratified by the Senate or otherwise authorized or
approved by the Congress. The definition [of disarmament] . . . would not
permit steps to strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of
peace pursuant to agreement without authorization or approval of that
agreement in some manner by the Congress.
H.R. REP. No. 1165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2903, 2911.
The Senate expressed similar sentiments nearly 40 years earlier when it passed the
Connally Resolution, which provided that any treaty designed to produce international
cooperation receive approval of two-thirds of the Senate. S. REs. No. 192, 89 CONG. REC.
9329 (Nov. 5, 1943).
60 H.R. REP. No. 863, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1114.
61 S. RES. No. 192, 89 CONG. REc. 9329 (Nov. 5, 1943).
62 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2590 (1988)).
6 H.R. REP. No. 863, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1110, 1115.
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executive agreements. 64 Section 33 apparently does not allow for
the possibility of any arms control agreement being reached that is a
sole executive agreement. 65 The clearest statement of congressional
intent as to the meaning of section 33 is found in the subsequent
legislative history of the 88th Congress, not in the legislative history
of the 87th Congress, which originally enacted section 33.66 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has warned against using the views of a
later Congress to definitively establish the meaning of an earlier en-
actment. 67 The Court has stated that such views may nevertheless be
persuasive, if not definitive, 68 but "even when it would otherwise be
useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reason-
able interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language
and legislative history prior to its enactment." 69
At one time it might have been questionable whether the literal
language of section 33 providing that any arms control agreement be
concluded "pursuant to the treaty making power of the President
under the Constitution" contemplated sole executive agreements as
well as article II treaties. The Supreme Court has on at least one
occasion construed the term "treaty," as contained within an act of
Congress, to include executive agreements as well as article II trea-
ties. 70 Nevertheless, despite the legal arguments on statutory con-
struction that could be made to broaden the scope of section 33's
proviso to include sole executive agreements, in Weinberger v. Rossi, 71
the Court stated in dictum that the reference in section 33 to "the
treaty making power of the President under the Constitution" explic-
itly refers to article II treaties. 72
If the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 33 is correct,
the question is presented whether section 33's restriction on the
methods of concluding arms control agreements, with its exclusion
of sole executive agreements as one of the approved methods, is
constitutional.
IV. The Constitutionality of Section 33 of the Arms Control Act
Addressing whether section 33 of the Arms Control and Dis-
64 22 U.S.C. § 2567 (1988).
65 See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at 173-84. The Supreme Court has so con-
cluded. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30 (1982).
66 H.R. Rep. No. 863, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S. CooE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1110, 1115.
67 See, e.g., Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 778 (1981); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980); Seatrain Ship-
building Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.. 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980).
618 See, e.g., Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983).
() Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980).
70 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30, 36 (1982).
71 Id. at 25.
72 Id. at 30.
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armament Act is constitutional, the Restatement hedges: "It is argua-
ble that the Act does not purport to bar commitments which the
President may have power to make under his own Constitutional au-
thority."'73 The Restatement does not state that the Act could not bar
such commitments, nor does the Restatement state that to the extent
that the Act does it is unconstitutional. 74 Arguably, the Restatement
could not make this further conclusion because Congress unques-
tionably has a constitutional role to play in any agreements touching
the core of the U.S. armed forces. 75 Congress clearly believes this is
true with respect to nuclear arms control. While Congress histori-
cally may have played no role in most treaty negotiation processes,
the joint resolution of Congress on September 30, 1972,76 approv-
ing the SALT I accord, directed the Executive branch in its future
strategic weapons negotiations with the Soviet Union to seek
equivalency in strategic nuclear force deployments, to prevent the
Soviet Union from developing a first-strike capability, and to provide
for treaty withdrawal if doing so was in the supreme national inter-
ests of the United States. 77 These congressional policies guided and
influenced the SALT II negotiation process. 78 In 1976 the Senate
passed a resolution reiterating that the only acceptable SALT II
treaty would be one based on U.S.-Soviet strategic force equiva-
lence. 79 In 1977 Congress involved itself in the strategic nuclear
arms negotiation process in an unprecedented fashion by sending its
own delegation to Geneva to participate in. the SALT II
negotiations."0
A partial review of activities within both the House8 l and the
73 RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 303 Reporters' Note 8.
74 Id.
75 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
76 H.R.J. RES. 1227, Pub. L. No. 92-448, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 746 (1972).
77 Id.
78 T. WOLFE, supra note 9, at 45.
79 S. RES. 406, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
80 See T. WOLFE, supra note 9, at 46-47.
81 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY: REPORT
OF A STAFF STUDY MISSION TO INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF) SITES
IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, 101st Cong., ist Sess. (Comm.
Print 1989); Conventional Defense in Europe and Status of Force Reduction Talks: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, H.R.
Doc. No. 101, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Defining Conventional Stability in the European
Theatre. Hearing Before the Defense Policy Panel of the House Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Doc.
No. 104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Special Panel on the Strategic Defense Initative Panel of
the House Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Doc. No. 90, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Nuclear
Testing: Arms Control Opportunities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Soviet
Mobilization Readiness and the U.S. Defense Program: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Doc. No. 86, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); War Powers:
Origins, Purposes, and Applications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); The
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Its Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy:
Hearings and Markup on H.R. Res. No. 422 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
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Senate 82 during just the last term of the Reagan administration re-
flects their active interest in U.S. military and disarmament policy.
On the legislative front, in 1985 and 1988 Congress added special
reporting requirements to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act8 3
that directed the President to submit three annual reports to Con-
gress addressing the following issues: (1) adherence of the United
Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); SDI
Program: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel and Research and Development Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Doc. No. 31, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); DEFENSE
POLICY PANEL OF HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
BREAKOUT, VERIFICATION AND FORCE STRUCTURE: DEALING WITH THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF
START 21 (Comm. Print 1987); Overview of U.S. Arms Control Policy: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Review of U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); SUBCOMMS. ON RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 100TH CONG.,
2D SESS., A REVIEW OF MAJOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS 22 (Comm. Print 1988);
Soviet Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, In-
ternational Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Review of the ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute and SDI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); National Security Policy: Hearing Before the Defense Policy Panel of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); SPECIAL PANEL ON ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT, HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., RE-
VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES 24 (Comm. Print 1987); HOUSE
COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, H.R. DOC.
No. 57, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987); HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONTINUED
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS, H.R. CON. RES. 350, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1986); The Implications ofAbandoning SALT Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Inter-
national Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986)
(statements of Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, and Ralph Earl, former Direc-
tor of the Arms Control and Disarmement Agency); HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES,
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI) PROGRAM, H.R. Doc. No. 30, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1986); HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REVIEW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-
MENT ACTIVITIES, H.R. Doc. No. 18, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986); HOUSE COMM. ON
ARMED SERVICES, THlE MX MISSILE AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE-THEIR IMPLI-
CATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 14, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1985); HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR, H.R. DOC. No. 15,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); SPECIAL PANEL ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT HOUSE
COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REVIEW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DIS-
ARMAMENT ACTIVITIES 23 (Comm. Print 1984).
82 See, e.g., The INF Treaty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE INF TREATY MONI-
TORING AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, S. REP. No. 318, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988);
A TO Defense and the IAF Treaty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ABM TREATY INTER-
PRETATION RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); National Security
Strategy: Hearing Be/bre the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
Soviet Treatv Violations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); Soviet Strategic Force Developments: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Strategic and
Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services and the Subcomm. on Defense of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); AIX Peacekeeper lissile Program:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Defense of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
83 Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 705, § 1002 (1985); Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102 Stat.
2032, § 905 (1988) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2592-2592b (1988)).
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States and other nations to obligations undertaken in arms control
agreements; 4 (2) compliance of the Soviet Union with its arms con-
trol commitments; 8 5 and (3) U.S. arms control strategy.8 6 In ad-
dressing this last issue, the President is to include: (a) a description
of the nature and sequence of the future arms control efforts of the
United States; (b) a net assessment of the current effects of arms con-
trol agreements on the military balance with the Soviet Union; (c) a
net assessment of the effect that proposed arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union would likely have on U.S. force plans; (d) an
assessment of the effect that proposed treaty subceilings and asym-
metries would have on the military balance; and (e) a statement of
the strategy the United States will use to verify noncompliance with
proposed arms control treaties with the Soviet Union.8 7
The 1988 National Defense Authorization Act88 contains several
senses of Congress relating to arms control and national security is-
sues. Among them are the following: a sense of Congress that any
START treaty should not include any provision resulting in a large
asymmetric reduction in any leg of the triad;89 a sense of Congress
that the Congress, in exercising its constitutional authority to raise
and support the Armed Forces, has a role to play in arms control and
defense policy, but the Congress should not interfere with the con-
stitutional authority of the President to negotiate and implement
treaties;9 0 and a sense of Congress that the President should propose
an early date to conduct the overdue five-year review of the ABM
Treaty.9 In the House Conference Report to the 1988 Defense Au-
thorization Act9 2 the conferees expressed their views on limiting the
deployment of certain strategic weapons:
The conferees believe that maintaining interim restraint in strategic
offensive force levels is not only prudent in light of current budget
realities, but also consistent with the recent progress in the START
negotiations and the continuing Soviet practice of retiring older
ICBMs and SLBMs prior to the end of their normal service life. As-
suming that progress continues to be made in START and that the
Soviet Union continues early retirements of ICBMs and SLBMs, it
would be the intent of the conferees to take such actions as may be
required to maintain U.S. and Soviet interim restraint, including the
option of foregoing the overhaul of additional Poseidon-class sub-
marines nearing the end of their normal service life.9 3
84 22 U.S.C. § 2592.
85 Id. § 2592a.
86 Id. § 2592b.
87 Id. § 2592b(a).
88 Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102 Stat. 1918 (1988).
89 Id. § 902.
90 Id. § 903.
91 Id. § 904.
92 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 989, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2571.
93 Id.
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Against this legislative backdrop, if the President has the inher-
ent power as Commander-in-Chief to conclude an arms control
agreement through a sole executive agreement, it must be seriously
questioned whether he can still do so in the face of an act of Con-
gress requiring congressional approval of all arms control agree-
ments, coupled with thirty years of active congressional involvement
in the negotiation process and oversight of the compliance record as
reflected in the previously mentioned reports, resolutions, and en-
actments. It is fundamental that presidential agreements cannot su-
persede an act of Congress, since the President has no constitutional
power to repeal federal law. Nevertheless, the fundamental inquiry
is whether arms control is an area reserved exclusively to the Presi-
dent in which he may conclude an international agreement that is
beyond the reach of any congressional regulation ex ante. Justice
Robert Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case94 proposed that:
[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the express
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
he can rely upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain ex-
clusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject.9 5
Even though section 33 is purely a procedural limitation on the Pres-
ident's power, arguably it limits his authority in an area over which
the Congress exercises concurrent power, given the congressional
power to declare war and to raise and support an army.96 But any
limitation on presidential authority premised on the Steel Seizure Case
must be tempered by. the realization that that opinion dealt with an
essentially domestic matter couched in terms of an international cri-
sis, the Korean War.9 7 Does Congress have the constitutional au-
thority to define both its and the President's powers to direct the
armed forces?
The restrictive view holds that, where constitutional powers are
concurrent, "Congress may occupy the field by prior legislation, ' 9 8
but section 303, comment i, of the Restatement states that the question
remains an open one:
Congress has not enacted restrictions on sole executive agreements
94 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 If.S. 579 (1952). In that case,
American steel mills and their employees were unable to reach a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 582. After government efforts at mediation failed, the employees' union
gave notice of its intention to strike. Id. at 583. Due to U.S. involvement in the Korean
War and the importance of steel to the American war effort, President Truman issued an
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of these steel mills
in order to keep them operating. Id. The Supreme Court held that this seizure was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 589.
95 Id. at 637-38 (concurring opinion).
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-12.
97 See supra note 94.
98 Mathews, supra note 23, at 381.
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generally, but some statutory restrictions on Presidential authority
would forbid some sole executive agreements. For example, the
War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548, prohibits
the President from making agreements that commit the United
States to introduce armed forces into hostilities or into situations
where involvement in hostilities is likely, or to increase or redeploy
United States combat forces abroad. See also the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act .... The validity of such restrictions on Presiden-
tial powers, and of attempts to control and limit executive agree-
ments generally, has not been authoritatively determined and may
differ according to the character of the restriction and the circum-
stances of its application.
99
Several alternatives exist by which Congress could control the
President's exercise of his power to conclude arms control agree-
ments. If the President were tempted to conclude an arms control
agreement through the sole executive agreement, the question then
is what, if anything, Congress could do about it.
The article II, section 2 check of the Senate is not the only con-
gressional rein on the Executive in the foreign affairs field. Among
the many constitutional checks Congress retains is the seldom in-
voked, yet formidable, impeachment and removal power. Article II,
section 4 provides: "The President ... shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors." Whether the phrase "other high
crimes and misdemeanors" includes acts other than indictable crimi-
nal offenses, such as maladministration, remains an open question.
In its analysis and interpretation of the Constitution, the Congres-
sional Research Service of the Library of Congress states that "a re-
spectable case can be made for either view. Practice over the years,
however, insofar as the Senate deems itself bound by the actions of
previous Senates, would appear to limit the grounds of conviction to
indictable criminal offenses for all officers with the possible excep-
tion of judges."' 0 0 During the impeachment proceedings against
President Andrew Johnson, who was impeached on the ground that
he had violated the "Tenure of Office" Act, both views were es-
poused.' 0 1 Representative Butler contended that an impeachable
high crime or misdemeanor includes an act that is highly prejudicial
to the public interest but is not necessarily an indictable criminal of-
fense in and of itself,10 2 while formerJustice Benjamin Curtis argued
that only grave offenses made criminal by statute at the time the acts
were committed are included.' 0 3 Of course, the idea that the Presi-
dent can be impeached and removed from office for maladministra-
99 RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 303 comment i.
100 S. Doc. No. 16, supra note 15, at 606.
101 G. SMITH, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS-THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF AN-
DREW JOHNSON 285-86 (1976).
102 Id. at 607.
103 Id.
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tion short of commission of an indictable offense suggests a
parliamentary form of responsible government in which the Prime
Minister resigns upon a vote of no confidence within the Parliament.
Given the unsettled nature of the question, only a very bold or very
rash President would flirt with the possibility of inviting impeach-
ment proceedings against him for concluding a sole executive arms
control agreement despite a clear congressional expression to the
contrary based upon one of the generally recognized powers of
Congress.
A second constitutional check on the power of the President to
conclude sole executive international agreements is congressional
control over appropriations and any associated legislation that may
be necessary to implement the agreement. The power of the purse
may be used to curtail the President's exercise of his power as Com-
mander-in-Chief. 0 4 If the President reaches an arms control accord
which requires the expenditure of funds for its execution, Congress
can frustrate that agreement by refusing to appropriate the necessary
funds. (That fact, of course, has no direct bearing on the legality of
such agreements, but only on the soundness of concluding them
without also seeking congressional approval).' 0 5
Third, Congress could abolish or limit the size of the army and
navy, if it so desired, by refusing or failihg to appropriate funds for
their maintenance. 10 6 By the same token, as Commander-in-Chief,
the President arguably has the power to commit the armed forces of
the United States10 7 and to terminate a defense treaty without prior
congressional approval,' 0 8 a power that could certainly implicate the
104 See Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758,
762-63 (1989).
105 It is practically inconceivable that the Supreme Court would invalidate such an
agreement,' since the Court generally considers conflicts between Congress and the Presi-
dent over the foreign affairs power a non-justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 & n.31 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 166 (1803);
C. RossITER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 145
(1976). This especially holds true in areas drawing upon military judgment. See id. at 145
n.14. See generally Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805
(1989); Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 814
(1989). But see Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation "?, 83
Am. J. INT'L L. 766, 773-75 (1989). Professor Franck suggests that presidential use of
military power should be checked by the federal judiciary and that Congress should assist.
Id. at 773. "To this end," Professor Franck writes, "the legislation [restricting the Presi-
dent's use of U.S. armed forces], in addition to spelling out clear, applicable standards,
should specifically authorize the courts to umpire, and create the procedural requirements
for a 'case or controversy' between Congress and President." Id. at 774.
106 See Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), aff'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897)
("Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether; but so
long as we have military force Congress cannot take away from the President the supreme
command.").
107 Id.
lo See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (an order vacating and remanding the
Court's grant of certiorari).
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deployment of U.S. armed forces. Thus, Congress may limit the mili-
tary resources at the disposal of the President, and may refuse to
pass implementing legislation to carry into effect an executive
agreement.
However, to conclude from these powers that Congress may tie
the hands of the President in advance from concluding arms reduc-
tion agreements arguably strips the President of his power to con-
duct foreign affairs in the most sensitive of all areas, the national
security of the United States. Congress does not have the power to
reverse a construction of the Constitution by legislation and thereby
in effect amend it.109 If section 33 falls into this category, then it
clearly is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the President cannot
bind Congress in an area of concurrent power, and once Congress
has legislated, the President is oath bound to "faithfully execute"
that law. 110 How can this paradox be resolved? One commentator
has suggested that in times of crisis, the President should enjoy a
reciprocal power in those areas where power is shared with Con-
gress.IlI The exigencies created by nuclear arsenals with their swift
and deadly delivery systems demand that the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, spokesperson for the United States in foreign af-
fairs, and executor of the laws of the United States, be able to
undertake prompt action in the interests of national survival without
being unnecessarily shackled by Congress in that effort. Indeed, in a
more broad sense, Wallace McClure has argued that "the two-thirds
rule governing the Senate's approval of treaties is not only undemo-
cratic but also, because of its capacity to produce stalemate in time of
crisis, a peril to the national welfare."' 12 The danger is not the risk
of having something improper done by the President, but rather it is
the risk of preventing him from accomplishing something critical to
national security. The failure of the Bricker Amendment in the early
1950s, which would have restricted the power of the President to
conclude executive agreements, is some evidence that many within
Congress recognized the need for flexibility within the presidency
for conducting foreign affairs. The difficulty with this approach is its
potential for inviting arbitrary exercise of unfettered power by the
President during a pretextual "national emergency." Moreover, the
President could have vetoed section 33, which purportedly ties his
hands. It is questionable whether a sitting President's failure or re-
fusal to veto this legislation should inure to the eternal detriment of
his successors.
This question would be more intriguing had Congress been
109 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
I lo U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
1 1 1 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring).
112 W. MCCLURE, supra note 23, at 32.
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merely a spectator in the arms control field over the past three de-
cades, effectively abandoning it to the President. The plain fact,
however, is that it has not. To the contrary, over the past fifteen
years Congress has practically micromanaged U.S. arms control pol-
icy and strategy.' 13 It has not given the President broad, unfettered
grants of discretionary power to act in this field." 4 It has not acqui-
esced in any practice of concluding arms control agreements
through the sole executive agreement device."l 5 In short, given the
unbroken congressional practice of steering U.S. arms control pol-
icy-a practice known by the President -and never seriously chal-
lenged by him-this past practice should be treated as a gloss on the
powers vested in Congress to declare war and to raise and support
an army.' 1 6
If Congress can constitutionally require submission of all arms
control agreements to it for its approval, those agreements could be
either presented to the Senate for its advice and consent (thus seek-
ing treatment as an article II, section 2 treaty), or they could be
presented to the full Congress, thereby becoming congressional-ex-
ecutive agreements. Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act gives the President this option.' '7 The option he should
choose is addressed in the next part of this Article.
V. Submission of Arms Control Agreements for Full Congressional
Approval
Of the four methods for concluding international agreements,
the congressional-executive agreement is currently preferred for at
least two reasons.' 18 First, from the President's standpoint, it avoids
the one-third-plus-one veto of the Senate. "19 From the standpoint of
the House of Representatives, the congressional-executive agree-
ment puts the House into the decision-loop of international agree-
113 See supra notes 81-82.
114 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2592-2592b (1988).
''5 Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
116 Compare id. at 686 (The President had authority to suspend outstanding claims
against Iran because "a systematic unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on
'Executive Power.' " (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952))). But see Raven-Hansen, Nuclear [Far Powers, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 786 (1989),
where the author concludes that "Congress has been on notice of presidential claims to
nuclear war powers, and of our first-use policy in particular, for so long and with so many
opportunities to disapprove during at least the annual defense appropriations cycle, that it
must be deemed to have acquiesced by now." Id. at 791 (footnotes omitted).
''7 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631, § 33 (1961)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1988)).
1 8 See Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, S.
REP. No. 205, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984).
119 For a discussion of the fate of the SALT 11 Treaty in the Senate, see S. TALBOTr,
ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT II 285-86 (1979).
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ments. 120 The slow, albeit deliberate, treaty-making process should
be rejected as the method of choice for concluding arms control
agreements. The need to quickly conclude arms control agreements
compels resort to more expeditious approval methods. 12 ' More-
over, even if the Senate does not give its advice and consent, an arms
control agreement may nevertheless be observed by the executive
branch as if it had formal treaty status.' 22
The SALT experience is instructive on two counts. First,
although the Senate never gave its consent to ratification of the
SALT II treaty, both the Carter and Reagan administrations con-
ducted themselves as though it were a binding obligation of the
United States. The same is true of the SALT I treaty that expired in
1977. The unratified SALT II treaty was a de facto, if not de jure,
sole executive agreement, adhered to in most material respects even
by the Reagan administration. 2 3 Second, the SALT II experience
sadly demonstrates how a one-third minority in the Senate can
thwart an arms control agreement widely viewed as being in the best
interests of the United States.' 2 4 Even Ronald Reagan, who when
campaigning for his first term labeled SALT II as being "fatally
flawed," adhered to its provisions during his first term as President
and only exceeded SALT II limits marginally thereafter in November
1986 (a decision of symbolic rather than strategic importance).' 2 5
If policy considerations, rather than a literal reading of the text
of the Constitution, provide the answer to the question of whether
an international agreement may be concluded through some method
other than the article II treaty process, these events shed some light
on this question. Although the SALT II debacle with the Senate may
have been episodic, the lesson to Presidents is clear: avoid the Sen-
ate's article II, section 2 one-third-plus-one veto. Fortunately, sec-
tion 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act gives the
President the option of presenting arms control agreements to the
full Congress for approval. As the foregoing has shown, the House
of Representatives has had a very sharp interest in the arms control
process; it has been far from a passive observer.' 26 In addition, en-
listing the House in the approval process, which would simultane-
ously eliminate the one-third Senate treaty veto, would make the
entire arms control process more democratic.
120 L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at 175-76.
121 See L. MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN
POLICY 96 (1986).
122 See McDougal & Lans, supra note 28, at 321.
123 See Keeny, Congress-The Last Best Hope for SALT II, 16 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, No.
9, Dec. 1986 at 1; Bumpers, Chafee & Leahy, supra note 10, at 3-6.
124 See generally Keeny, supra note 123; Interview of Senator John H. Chafee by Arms
Control Today, 17 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19, No. 2, Mar. 1987.
12 ' See ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY 57 (1989).
126 See supra note 81.
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Nevertheless, in order to avoid a repeat of the SALT II fiasco in
the future, a close partnership must be developed between the Hill
and the White House. One way of building that kind of close, work-
ing relationship is to use the "fast-track" congressional approval
process that has been used successfully for the past fifteen years in
the negotiation, conclusion, and approval of bilateral and multilat-
eral trade agreements between the United States and its foreign trad-
ing partners.
VI. The "Fast-Track" Trade Agreement Approval Process
During the past sixty years, beginning with the disastrous
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,127 Congress and the President
have wrestled over which branch would assume primary responsibil-
ity for the management of U.S. international trade policy and negoti-
ations. 128  This inter-branch rivalry peaked in 1965 with the
conclusion of the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Agreement -2 9
the product of secret negotiations conducted by the executive
branch and presented to Congress for its approval after the conclu-
sion of the negotiations.' 3 0 Unchastened by the congressional out-
rage that followed the Auto Pact negotiations,' 3 1 U.S. trade
negotiators during the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions used the President's sole executive agreement authority to
conclude the Antidumping Code without prior congressional
approval. 13 2
In an attempt to reestablish its constitutional prerogatives in the
international trade field, Congress refused for the next eight years to
delegate negotiating authority to the President, thereby disabling his
attempts to enter into meaningful trade negotiations. 13 3 Absent
genuine assurances from the President that Congress would enact
implementing legislation following the conclusion of such trade
agreements, the President's credibility in negotiations with trading
partners was severely undercut.134
With the advent of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations in 1974, Congress realized that the United States had to send
to the bargaining table in Geneva negotiators who would be per-
ceived as having genuine bargaining authority for the United
127 Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
12A See Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALEJ. INT'L L. 193, 201-10 (1987).
129 United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965,Jan. 16, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093, entered into force Sept. 16, 1966.
13o Koh, supra note 128, at 203.
131 See id. at 203 n.34.
1.3 Id. at 204.
133 Id.
34 Id. at 204 & n.39.
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States. 135 Consequently, Congress recanted in part by enacting the
Trade Act of 1974136 under which Congress gave the President an
initial five-year authorization (extended through 1993 and expanded
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988137) to
conclude trade agreements to harmonize, reduce, or eliminate
nontariff barriers and distortions to international trade in goods.
This authorization was expanded to cover trade in services and di-
rect foreign investment under the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. 138
Congress thus delegated to the President broad authority to negoti-
ate nontariff barrier trade agreements, but this authority was subject
to strict notification and consultation requirements in advance of en-
tering into such agreements. 139 The inducement for complying with
these requirements was the creation of an innovative and expedited
"fast-track" congressional approval process of all such trade agree-
ments; 140 there would be no bottling up in committee, 14 1 no amend-
135 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, § 102 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1982)).136 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2187
(1982)).
137 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, § 1102 (1988).
138 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, §§ 101-102 (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2111-2112). See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(g)(3) (defines "barrier," "distortion," and
"international trade").
139 See Koh, supra note 128, at 205.
140 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7253-58. The Senate Finance Committee summarized the
fast-track approval procedure in its report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
Section 102 of the [1974] Trade Act is unique in the history of congres-
sional delegations of trade negotiating authority to the President to negotiate
trade agreements with foreign countries providing for the harmonization, re-
duction, and elimination of nontariff barriers and other distortions of inter-
national trade, subject to procedures for the approval and implementation of
such agreements by the Congress....
The special procedures for consideration of legislation necessary or ap-
propriate to approve and implement trade agreements on nontariff barriers
to trade negotiated by the President under the authority of section 102 of the
[1974] Trade Act include:
(1) Congressional monitoring and advice during the course of the nego-
tiations (section 161 of the Trade Act);
(2) consultations with the Committee on Finance and with other com-
mittees of the Senate which have jurisdiction over legislation involving mat-
ters which would be affected by the trade agreements being negotiated,
including all matters related to the implementation of trade agreements such
as the desirability and feasibility of the proposed implementations (section
102 of the Trade Act);
(3) a 90-calendar-day prior notice to the Congress before the agree-
ments are entered into by the President (section 102 of the Trade Act); and
(4) submission of the agreements to the Congress with a draft of an im-
plementing bill and a statement of any administrative action proposed to im-
plement such agreements, an explanation of how the draft bill and proposed
administrative action change or affect existing law, and a statement explain-
ing how the agreements benefit U.S. commerce and why the bill and the ad-
ministrative action is required or appropriate to carry out the agreements
(section 102 of the Trade Act).
Special legislative procedures are established under sections 151 and
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
ments to the agreements, 142 and no filibusters. 143 This experiment
in congressional-executive cooperation proved to be a great success,
with Congress approving in thirty-four legislative days all nine multi-
lateral agreements negotiated by the President during the Tokyo
Round. 144 In the words of the Senate Finance Committee in its re-
port on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
The Trade Act [fast-track] procedures . .. are a unique Constitu-
tional experiment. They provide a structure for cooperation be-
tween the legislative and executive branches of the Government
during a complex international negotiation. The Congress adopted
the Trade Act procedures as a means to avoid conflicts between the
Congress and the President such as the dispute [over the Antidump-
ing Code] which occurred after the Kennedy Round. The Commit-
tee believes the Trade Act experiment in coordination is a success.
It expects this coordination to continue.
145
Although this constitutional experiment was a success as mea-
sured by the number of agreements approved by Congress under the
fast-track procedure, it came at a considerable price to the executive
branch by substantially curtailing the President's discretionary nego-
tiating authority. For example, Congress gave the President specific
negotiation objectives 146 and imposed prior consultation require-
ments with both congressional and private sector advisory commit-
tees. 147 Section 161(b)(1) of the 1974 Trade Act required that five
members of the House and five Members of the Senate be accredited
152 of the Trade Act of 1974 for consideration of the implementing package
submitted under section 102. These procedures are set forth as part of the
Rules of the Senate:
(1) Implementing bills pertaining to all trade agreements submitted
under section 102 must contain a provision approving the statement of pro-
posed administrative action, and provisions appealing or amending existing
law or providing new statutory authority that are necessary or appropriate to
implement the agreements;
(2) Implementing bills must be introduced (by request) by the Majority
Leader and Minority Leader, or their designees, and referred to the appro-
priate committee or committees;
(3) Implementing bills will be automatically discharged from commit-
tees after 45 working days, if not reported prior to that time, and a vote of
final passage must be taken on or before the 15th working day after such
discharge or after the bill is reported by the committee;
(4) A motion to proceed to consideration of an implementing bill is
highly privilege [sic] and not debatable; no motion to recommit the bill or to
reconsider the vote by which the bill is agreed or disagreed to is in order; and
(5) Debate must be limited to 20 hours, equally divided between those
favoring and those opposing the bill, and a motion to further limit debate is
not debatable.
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979).
141 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(1).
142 Id. § 2191(0)(1), (g)(1).
143 Id. § 2191(f)(2), (g)(2).
144 See Koh, supra note 128, at 205 & n.43.
145 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979).
146 19 U.S.C. §§ 2113-2115 (1988).
147 Id. §§ 2211(b)(1), 2155 (1988).
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,as official advisors to the U.S. negotiating delegations.' 4  These
congressional control mechanisms were reenacted in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979149 and tightened in the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984.150
In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress again considered
the question of how best to forge a congressional-executive partner-
ship that would give the President sufficient latitude to negotiate
trade agreements, but would also repose in Congress adequate su-
pervision of that process. Against the backdrop of the then recently
concluded free trade agreement with Israel,' 5 ' Congress enacted ti-
tle IV of the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act,152 which modified the fast-
track procedure by adding a sixty-day notification requirement of in-
tent to enter into free trade negotiations with any country other than
Israel.' 53 Under this new provision, if the President failed to give the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Commit-
tee at least sixty days notice of his intent to enter into bilateral free
trade negotiations, any free trade agreement subsequently reached
would not receive congressional consideration under the fast-track
approval process.' 54 As observed by Professor Harold Koh, this
new consultation provision strengthened Congress's hand in mold-
ing the shape of any free trade agreement:
First, the sixty-day prenotice committee consultation period secured
the involvement of the two committees months before negotiations
began, and allowed them to extract concessions from the President
as a condition of letting negotiations proceed. Second, the Adminis-
tration's awareness that any negotiated agreement must ultimately
return to those same committees for subsequent approval promoted
continuing consultation as the agreement evolved. Third, either
148 19 U.S.C. § 221 l(a)(1) (1988). As reported by the Senate Finance Committee in
this connection:
From the beginning of the substantive negotiations in the [Tokyo
Round] .... committee members and staff made periodic trips to Geneva
and to various capitals [sic] to monitor the negotiations .... Senators and
staff attended multilateral and bilateral negotiating sessions, met with offi-
cials of the GAT, and consulted with the head of the United States delega-
tion and key members of his staff.
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
149 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). See 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1982).
150 Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
151 Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, United States-Israel, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 653. See Note, Free Trade Area Agreements and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1281, 1302-04 (1986).
152 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note.
153 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(4)(A).
154 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(4)(A)(ii). As noted by Professor Koh,
nothing in the language of the 1984 Act requires the President to engage in
the sixty-day committee consultation period before negotiations begin. . ..
However, the Reagan Administration chose to construe the provision cau-
tiously, notifying the committees of its intent to negotiate the Canada FTA
[Free Trade Agreement] 60 legislative days before the date it intended to
initiate formal negotiations.
Koh, supra note 128, at 210 n.61 (emphasis in original).
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House retained the option to vote down a fully negotiated agree-
ment after it had been discharged from committee.
15 5
Moreover, if either committee disapproved of such negotiations,
any agreement package subsequently submitted to Congress for its
approval would not receive expedited consideration. 5 6 The U.S.-
Canada free trade negotiations, for example, barely escaped a disap-
proval vote by the Senate Finance Committee, which divided evenly
on the motion to disapprove.1 57
Congress continues to micromanage the international trade
agenda by identifying the principal U.S. trade-negotiating objectives
which the executive branch is to pursue. For example, in the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,158 Congress identified
no less than sixteen negotiating objectives I5 9 -including dispute set-
tlement,' 60 trade and monetary coordination,' 6' agriculture, 6 2
trade in services, 163 intellectual property, 164 direct foreign invest-
ment,1 6 5 worker rights,166 and access to high technologyI 67 -and
conditioned approval of any trade agreement upon its meeting those
objectives. 16 8
Under this current fast-track approval procedure, 169 the Presi-
dent is required to give sixty-day advance notice of negotiations and
thereafter consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee before entering into any trade agree-
ment.' 7 0 The trade agreement will enter into force upon compliance
with the following procedure. First, at least ninety days before enter-
ing into such a trade agreement, the President must notify both
houses of Congress of his intention to enter into such an agree-
ment.' 7 ' Second, after entering into the trade agreement, the Presi-
dent must transmit a copy of the agreement together with a draft
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See id. at 211.
158 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-3111 (1988)).
159 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988).
160 Id. § 2901(b)(1).
161 Id. § 2901(b)(6).
162 Id. § 2901(b)(7).
163 Id. § 2901(b)(9).
164 Id. § 2901(b)(10).
165 Id. § 2901(b)(11).
166 Id. § 2901(b)(14).
167 Id. § 2901(b)(15).
168 Id. § 2902(b)(2), (c)(3)(A).
169 Id. §§ 2902-2903.
170 Id. § 2902(c)(3)(C), (d). If the President fails to consult, or if either Committee
votes disapproval of the negotiations, then any subsequent trade agreement and imple-
menting bill submitted to Congress will not receive fast-track consideration. Id.
§ 2903(c)(2). Such a disapproval resolution is as a practical matter the death knell of any
trade negotiation.
171 Id. § 2112(e)(1).
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implementing bill, a statement of administrative action, and a state-
ment of reasons why the agreement serves the best interests of U.S.
commerce. 172 Third, the implementing bill is introduced in both
Houses and referred to the appropriate committees. 173 If those
committees do not report the bill out within forty-five legislative days
after its introduction, then the committee is automatically discharged
from further consideration of the bill. 174 A vote on final passage
must take place within fifteen legislative days after the bill is reported
out of the committees.1 75 Floor debate in the House and Senate is
limited to twenty hours for each house. 176 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, no amendment may be made to an implementing bill.177
While these procedures break no new ground, one innovation
was introduced in the Omnibus Trade Act to serve as a further check
on the President. This innovation is a "reverse" fast-track provi-
sion' 78 under which Congress may decline to give fast-track consid-
eration to an implementing bill submitted under the fast-track
procedure if both Houses pass a procedural disapproval resolution
within sixty days after submission of the bill.179 The resolving clause
of such procedural disapproval resolution must state the following:
That the President has failed or refused to consult with Congress on
trade negotiations and trade agreements in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
and, therefore, the provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of
1974 shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect
to any trade agreement entered into under section 1102(b) or (c) of
such Act of 1988 .... 180
This provision may be at odds with the goal of fostering a col-
laborative and coordinated effort between Congress and the Presi-
dent in the international trade field. It is arguable whether Congress
needed to be heavy-handed in order to ensure that the President
would understand and share Congress's vision of international trade
negotiations as a joint legislative-executive effort. By first setting the
negotiating agenda and thereafter requiring the President to consult
with two congressional committees before, during, and after the ne-
gotiations as conditions precedent to invoking the fast-track ap-
proval procedure, Congress undoubtedly had all the leverage it
needed. In the fifteen-year history of the use of the fast-track proce-
dure, no evidence exists that Congress was circumvented in trade
172 Id. § 2903(a)(1)(B).
173 Id. § 2191(c).
174 Id. § 2191(e)(1) & (3).
175 Id. § 2191(e)(1).
176 Id. § 2191(f)(2) & (g)(2).
177 Id. § 2191(d).
178 Id. § 2903(c).
175 Id. § 1103(c)(l)(A). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 535
(1988), repinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1568.
180 19 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1)(E).
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negotiations.'"' No mention is made in the House Conference Re-
port to the 1988 Omnibus Act why this provision was considered
necessary.18 2
VII. A Fast-Track Arms Control Procedure--Conclusion
As reflected by the many committee reports and hearings on
arms control issues, the arms control reporting requirements added
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and more recently the
express directives to the President in the 1988 Defense Authoriza-"
tion Act to pursue specific objectives in arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union, it is clear that Congress has taken an active
interest in the progress of the arms control process. Nevertheless,
even with the renewed interest and more active role Congress has
played in the arms control field, the arms control process as a whole
has floundered and is at a standstill. Exemplified best by the INF
Treaty,' 8 3 progress has been reactive, halting, and is at best of sym-
bolic, rather than strategic, importance. Eugene Rostow blames
what he considers to be the inherent limitations of Congress to set a
foreign policy agenda, subject as it is to short-term, parochial inter-
ests and an inability to act quickly and secretly. 184 Professor Lori
Damrosch attributes this state of affairs more to congressional lassi-
tude than institutional inability:
The Framers of the Constitution doubtless contemplated that the
President and the Congress would be partners in foreign policy deci-
sions that could lead to war. Two hundred years later, the forms of
the partnership have changed, but the concept of congressional
involvement has not. The main difference is that Congress has opted
to be the silent partner. It has deliberately decided to be involved
remotely, partially, through a select few of its members who may
offer advice but have few means to change a presidential
decision. 18
5
The arms control process clearly needs to be rationalized and
better coordinated, but the question remains as to which branch of
government should assume the lead. In the author's view, based on
the many statutory directions to the President in the arms control
field, coupled with extensive committee oversight of arms control
negotiations, treaty compliance, and weapon development and de-
ployment, Congress has not abdicated to the President and, to the
contrary, has taken a greater leadership role in arms control than the
181 See generally G. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIA-
TION (1986).
182 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 535 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1568.
183 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF
Treaty), Dec. 8, 1987, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entered into force
June 1, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 90 (1988).
184 Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 750, 752-54 (1989).
'85 Damrosch, Covert Operations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 795, 804-05 (1989).
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executive branch in the last decade. To increase the pace and effi-
ciency of the arms control process, Congress should use the fast-
track trade agreement approval process as its blueprint. The follow-
ing steps should be taken.
First, building on what it has already done in the reporting re-
quirements of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act' 8 6 and in the
1988 Defense Authorization Act,' 87 Congress should set a clear arms
control agenda identifying specific objectives the President should
pursue in negotiations, such as the range of force levels within each
leg of the triad, weapons systems to be limited or banned, and verifi-
cation regimes. Congress would give the President an initial authori-
zation period for conducting fast-track negotiations. Three years
would be an ideal authorization period for several reasons. The
fourth year of a first-term President's office is full of re-election dis-
tractions. If fast-track negotiations are put on hold until after the
election, momentum will be lost. If the incumbent is not re-elected,
the negotiations may have been a complete waste of time. If the in-
cumbent is a lame duck, the Soviets may stall the procedures in the
hopes of getting a "better deal" from the new administration. By
setting the fast-track authorization period for three years, both the
U.S. and Soviet negotiators will know that there is little advantage in
stalling, and that stalling will only cause the benefits of fast-track
congressional approval to be lost.
Second, the President would indicate his intent to commence
negotiations, would agree to follow Congress's agenda in arms con-
trol negotiations with the Soviet Union, and would agree to consult
with relevant committees during the negotiations, in exchange for
which any agreement reached would receive fast-track consideration
from Congress, following the same timetable used in the fast-track
trade agreement legislation. The question here is which committees
should the President be required to notify and consult. Several can-
didate committees in both Houses immediately suggest themselves
as having the appropriate jurisdiction: in the House-the Armed
Services Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Intelli-
gence Committee; in the Senate-the Armed Services Committee,
the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Intelligence Committee.
The same question arose, of course, when Congress created the fast-
track process for international trade agreements. Although Con-
gress finally settled on the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee as the two committees that would ini-
tially disapprove any fast-track trade negotiations and with which the
186 Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2576-2579
(1988)).
187 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
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President would regularly consult during the course of the negotia-
tions, 18 in the author's view other committees arguably had an
equally legitimate jurisdictional claim, such as the House Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If Con-
gress was able to agree to just two committees-one from each
house-in the international trade field, the same should be true in
the arms control field.
Finally, once negotiations are concluded and an agreement
reached, it would be presented to Congress, together with any neces-
sary implementing legislation, for its approval or rejection without
amendment under time restrictions comparable to those contained
in the fast-track trade legislation. The "no amendment" feature of
the fast-track approval procedure is a critical element of the entire
fast-track approval package. It would enhance the credibility of U.S.
negotiators in the eyes of their Soviet counterparts, and it would act
as an incentive on both sides of the bargaining table to rapidly con-
clude major arms control agreements within the fast-track authoriza-
tion period.
Congress should build on the momentum created over the past
fifteen years and seize the initiative by forging a congressional-exec-
utive partnership in arms control. A precedent has been set in the
international trade field that serves as a model for creating this part-
nership. It should be given serious consideration.
188 See supra note 140.
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